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BOOK REVIEWS
LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION.
By Thomas Buergenthal. Syracuse University Press, 1969. Pp. viii,
247. $10.50.
The study of the constitutional structures of international
organizations is a subject still in its infancy. It suffers from a lack of
interested scholars, unavailability of necessary documentary materials,
and most crucially from the lawyer's point of view, a dearth of court
decisions in which constitutional issues are carefully framed, argued,
and decided. As a result, serious research in the field requires
immersion in the work of a particular organization, examining volumes
of debates in conferences, committees, and subcommittees to discover
how the constitution is interpreted in the practice of "parliamentary"
organs. Rather than making this effort, many writers in the area have
taken an alternative approach-comparative textual analysis of the
constitutive documents of several major international organizations.
-The weakness of this approach is aptly expressed by Professor
Buergenthal in the introduction to his book (pp. 1-2):
Although specialized international organizations evince a great many
structural and constitutional similarities, each of them has, since its establishment,
tended to develop an institutional personality or modus operandi of its own ...
These considerations tend to be overlooked by many who have written on the
law of international organizations. The literature consequently abounds with
comparative studies analyzing and juxtaposing the provisions found in the
constitutive instruments and resolutions of a host of organizations as if they were
fungible commodities. These frequently dazzling exercises in statutory
interpretation, supplemented by tidbits gleaned from the practice of one or the
other organization, fail more often than not to take account of the institutional
transformation that the constitutive instruments or the organizations themselves
have undergone. This in turn leads to factually untenable conclusions about the
legal significance that attaches to the actions of these organizations.
Professor Buergenthal has chosen the more difficult
approach-detailed examination of the actual operations of a single
organization. The work required a high degree of patience and
perseverance. Most delegates to the ICAO are non-lawyers whose
primary interest is civil aviation, so its meetings include relatively little
discussion of constitutional questions. Furthermore, important
decisions are sometimes made inadvertently or by the application of
laymen's "common sense" to questions of (unperceived) constitutional
importance. Professor Buergenthal gives every evidence of a thorough
knowledge of the first twenty years of ICAO practice, and his results
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show just how indispensable this information is. The book is even more
valuable because the author is refreshingly unafraid to point out the
errors and misunderstandings of other, often more superficial, analysts
(pp. 100, 116 n. 228, 173).
The book is divided into four areas of inquiry: membership,
legislative powers, dispute settlement, and amendment of the
Convention. The first and last have been fertile sources of
constitutional questions for ICAO, and its solutions are interesting in
terms of both substance and technique. Anyone familiar with the
"legislative" solution of constitutional questions by international
organizations will find his expectations largely confirmed in these two
areas-decisions are taken with an eye toward immediate political
effects; there is little appreciation for the constitutional significance or
the' history of the issues; and silent acquiescence often accompanies the
decision-making process. Professor Buergenthal points out that if an
issue is expressly identified as a legal issue, delegates are likely to
consult with their foreign offices for instruction; but when a problem
is not so identified, it is decided without such consultation. The
consequences are sometimes anomalous. For example, an amendment
to the provisions on amendment which was defeated in a formal vote
was later followed in practice because the solution seemed to the
delegates the only practical thing to do. Similarly, Professor
Buergenthal's material on dispute settlement confirms prior
expectations. Since ICAO Council Members staff their delegations
with technical purposes in mind, the delegates are generally unfamiliar
with the processes of international conflict resolution. The Council has
been reluctant to involve itself deeply in the settlement of disputes
presented to it, and its first response has been to suggest further
negotiations between the parties and to delay in the hope, perhaps well-
founded, that the political breakdown which led to the disagreement
would eventually be smoothed over. It. was not until after a dispute was
actually presented to the Council that it dealt with the question of
arbitration procedures, and most of the elements of the dispute
settlement mechanism are as yet untested. In each of these
areas-membership, amendment, and dispute settlement-this book
will serve as a useful guide for those who will be faced with similar
questions of ICAO practice and procedure in the future.
In the field of ICAO technical legislation, however, the
constitution readers are in for a surprise which has fundamental
implications for the design of new specialized agencies and ultimately
for the strategy for attainment of a world order system. Writers on
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international law and organizations (including this reviewer) have
touted the ICAO legislative procedure as a possible "next step" on the
road toward a more effective international legislative system, a system
which completely avoids the requirement of ratification and abandons
unanimity in the promulgation of the rule, putting on each state the
burden of choosing to reject. Briefly (and without examining any of the
pitfalls or inadequacies of the ICAO Convention which Professor
Buergenthal considers so meticulously), the scheme is designed as
follows: after consulting with the Members by soliciting their
comments on the draft, the 27-member ICAO Council adopts by a
two-thirds vote an Annex to the Convention on "matters concerned
with the safety, regularity, and efficiency of air navigation." 1 The
Annex, made up of Standards And Recommended Procedures
(SARPS), is then submitted to the Members, who may within a
specified time period (typically four months) signify their disapproval
of all or any part of the Annex. All parts not rejected by a majority
of the Members come into force for all Members at a subsequent date
designated by the Council (normally a year). Any state which
finds it impracticable to comply in all respects with any such international
standard or procedure . . . or which deems it necessary to adopt regulations or
practices differing in any particular respect from those established by an
international standard, shall give immediate notification to [ICAO] of the
differences between its own practice and that established by the international
standard.
2
Thus while a Member does not have to follow a SARP, it may not
ignore it. It must comply or positively specify its failure to do so and
the respects in which its regulations differ from the SARP. Since many
treaties contain clauses which permit withdrawal upon the giving of
notice, typically after a time interval of a year or less, the net effect is
almost the same as a treaty enacted by a Council with the acquiescence
of a majority of the Members and closely akin to legislation in the true
sense; all this is accomplished without elaborate special conferences or
the struggle for approval by dozens of national legislatures. The ICAO
scheme is therefore a substantial step forward-or so it would seem.
Professor Buergenthal has taken the time to examine the actual
practice of ICAO Members with respect to the notification
requirements and other aspects of implementation. The results are
startling. As of 1965, fourteen Annexes had been adopted by the ICAO
Council. If each Member had even one difference to report in relation
1. Article 37, Convention on International Civil Aviation, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No.
1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (1948).
2. Id. art. 38.
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to each Annex, there would have been just under 1500 reports, yet
ICA.O had received less than 700. These figures are representative of
the long-term ICAO experience, and taken with the following items,
they indicate widespread indifference rather than widespread
compliance. In 1965, 50 percent of the Members were using operating
instructions that corresponded to ICAO materials over three years out
of date, and another 25 percent, materials one to three years out of
date: Although a few states automatically incorporate by reference the
current ICAO SARPS into their national legislation, many more pass
their own substantive laws, which then have to be revised, if national
laws are to be kept current, when ICAO Annexes are amended. On the
judicial side, the ICAO Council has not arbitrated a single dispute to
decision. Only three national court cases have had occasion to examine
the effect of the ICAO SARPS, and one of the three held that they
did not take effect nationally without implementing legislation.
Of course, there are explanations for this state of affairs.
Primarily, many of the Members cannot spare the time of personnel
with the technical and legal capacity to identify significant differences
between national laws and the ICAO SARPS to prepare a report
notifying ICAO. In recognition of the difficulty of this task, ICAO has
twice revised its forms requesting notification of differences in the hope
of improving reportage. Furthermore, ICAO technical assistance
missions have helped with this problem in some countries. Simply
informing the operating personnel of changes is problematic when there
are over 100 Members with different languages and administrative
structures. Nevertheless, these results raise basic questions about the
value of "legislative" powers and the effective design of international
organizations.
Are the ICAO SARPS law? For lawyers, this is the crucial
question. What they mean by it is, would the SARPS serve as a
deciding principle in court, resulting in a decision different from that
which would be reached in their absence? On this issue, Professor
Buergenthal reaches what this reviewer considers an unfortunate
conclusion. Disagreeing with other writers whom he cites, he argues
that given the present disregard for ICAO SARPS, it would not be
reasonable for anyone (e.g., a pilot or a Member) to assume that the
failure of another Member to notify ICAO of a deviation from a given
SARP means that its regulations conform to the ICAO standards.
Therefore, reliance on the SARPS should not be a good defense for
an airline in a case such as the following: a plane from Member A
crashes in the territory of Member B as a result of a maneuver in
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accordance with the ICAO SARPS but in violation of conflicting
Member B regulations of which the pilot was unaware and which were
never communicated to ICAO. Consequently, injured passengers sue
the airline and Member B's aviation authority. This reviewer would
submit that, while in practice reliance on the SARPS might not be
well-advised, where a court action involves an allocation of loss
between an airline and a Member, the airline should win; the Member
should not be able to assert successfully that the widespread disregard
of the requirements of the ICAO Convention justified its failure to
communicate differences. This principle would not increase the risk of
accident since sensible pilots will certainly have a significant incentive
(their own safety) to inquire about local regulations. Furthermore,
placing the burden on the non-complying State may-serve as an
incentive for it to comply.
Given the above information about judicial activity and the role
of courts in the international legal system generally, however, the effect
of SARPS in court is relatively unimportant. The designer and analyst
of international organizations will also question whether ICAO
SARPS are law, but he may mean something different by it-are the
ICAO SARPS in fact followed in the conduct of the activities to which
they relate? No thorough research has been done by ICAO to obtain
an answer to this question. But the likelihood seems small, for here
international law runs into bureaucracy, the same obstacle that
occasionally impedes the effectiveness of national law.3 Bureaucracies
are rule-oriented systems. But bureaucrats are not lawyers or judges,
and the rules that they follow are not the laws as such. The rules are
found in handbooks, rulebooks, and organization manuals and they
are a gloss on the law-sometimes a simplification, sometimes an
interpretation, sometimes an elaboration or specification. Once the
rules are in the handbook, they are effectively changed only by
amendment of the handbook. No judicial decision, no legislative
enactment, and no statement of national policy has operational impact
until it has been filtered through the process of a change in the
bureaucratic handbook. Even then some people in the administrative
structure will not read the rule book, or having read it once will not
take time to read it again. And there is the further obstacle that the
people administering the system may be so unsympathetic toward the
current rules that they will subvert them by simply carrying on in the
old way.
3. These comments are inspired by the now-famous article by Roger Fisher in the Harvard
Law Review. Fisher, Bringing Law to Bear Upon Governments, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1130 (1961).
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In making international law effective, an additional layer of
institutional structures must be penetrated. The national bureaucrat,
assigned the task of implementing the laws of his nation, prepares the
administrative rulebook on the basis of the enactments of the
legislature. If the rules of international law are to be put in the
bureaucratic rulebook. they must somehow be channeled through the-
legislature or the chief executive in areas within his exclusive
competence. It is possible that the legislature would permit itself to
become a direct conduit. It could simply provide that the current
international law rules from a given source are to be treated as the law
of the nation. Professor Buergenthal notes that Sudan and Laos do
essentially this with ICAO SARPS, and in some countries, including
the United Kingdom, the legislature has expressly empowered (but not
required) the administrator to enact regulations giving effect to the
SARPS. He also notes with surprise that ICAO itself has done no
systematic study of the ways in which SARPS are implemented in
national legislation or regulations. Absent this type of conduit
approach, the administrator has no mechanical way of reaching the
conclusion that international law should be incorporated in his
rulebook; few will be so imaginative as to incorporate it on the basis
of their own reading of the national constitution or high Court
decisions holding that "international law is part of our law."' The
subtleties of distinguishing self-executing from non-self-executing
treaties and the relative absence of internationalist political pressure
(combined with the danger of angering a national legislature jealous of
its prerogatives) all reinforce the administrator's hesitation. A national
analogy to this process appeared in the persistence, pursuant to state
law, of dual systems of education in Mississippi, despite Supreme
Court decisions and Congressionally approved terminations of federal
aid. Perhaps in the long run the cautious attitude of the bureaucrat is
appropriate, for the creative and daring administrator who pursues the
ultimate legal truth as he sees it may be as much of a menace as a
blessing. But the effect on international law is generally to limit its
operational effectiveness to those circumstances where the legislature or
the chief executive has made a conscious decision to include it in the
national law out of which the bureaucratic rulebook is made. Thus the
Nuremberg principles are operational to the extent that they appear (as
they do) in the field manuals of the armed services. Occasionally, as
the examples cited above attest, these rules will be incorporated bodily
because they are the international rules; more often they will be
4. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,700 (1900).
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incorporated piece by piece after they have been evaluated on the merits
by national decision-makers who consider their international origin and
status as only one of many factors to be taken into account.
If the above analysis is correct, it might be argued that elaborate
concern with the "legal" or "recommendatory" character of the
resolutions of international organizations is misplaced. So long as their
decisions become effective only after evaluation on the merits by
national executives, legislatures, and high-ranking bureaucrats, it
matters little in which form they are offered for consideration. To say
that a resolution is "law" endows it with a mystique which may give
it greater weight in the minds of national decision-makers because of
what it communicates about the intentions of those who originally
approved it, the desirability of international uniformity in technical
fields, and the implications for international institutions if it is
disregarded without compliance with the requisite formalities (e.g.,
notification of differences). But the extent to which the characterization
of a resolution as law will be decisive is open to question. It is
significant in this context to notice another aspect of the "legislative"
development of ICAO. Completely without authority in the
Convention, the ICAO Council in its first years began to issue
recommendatoryProcedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) and
Regional Supplementary Procedure (SUPPS). These recommendations
elaborate and supplement the SARPS on a world-wide or regional
basis respectively. The unimportance of this absence of constitutive
support or legally binding quality is portrayed by the following
evaluation by Professor Buergenthal (pp. 116-17, 118-19):
The one significant consequence of this status is that PANS and SUPPS relating
to the Rules of the Air, because they are not incorporated by reference into Annex
2, are not governed by Article 12 of the Convention and thus cannot be deemed
to be obligatory over the high seas.
Apart from this consequence, the non-obligatory character of PANS and
SUPPS has no real practical significance. Since 1950, for example, the
requirement for the notification of differences, which Article 38 prescribes for
national deviations from international standards, has been applied not only to
recommended practices but to PANS and SUPPS as well. PANS have, moreover,
been gradually assimilated to SARPS to the extent that the Assembly lumps these
regulatory materials together in setting guidelines for their formulation and
implemention. There is no reason to assume, furthermore, that the Contracting
States distinguish between SARPS, PANS, and SUPPS when deciding whether
or not to comply with these regulations. The United States, for example, applies
the same implementation criteria to PANS and SUPPS as it does to SAPRS.
(Emphasis added).
It is thus readily apparent that the ICAO Annexes, PANS, SUPPS, and
Regional Air Navigation Plans constitute an integrated body of aviation
1970]
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legislation comparable both in structure and content to comprehensive air
navigation codes. (footnotes omitted)
This conclusion is a very unsettling one, for it means that the effort of
the drafters of the ICAO Convention to give the ICAO a greater
legislative authority than, for example, the United Nations General
Assembly, has essentially failed. The elaborate constitutional system
for law-making has never grown beyond a system for recorfimending,
and the crucial distinguishing legal feature, communication of
differences, is widely ignored. Although the ICAO Secretariat has been
working vigorously for several years on the problem of Member
compliance, Professor Buergenthal indicates that there is little
likelihood of a major alteration of the present state of affairs. This
failure is strikingly at odds with the widely expressed expectation that
the multitude of functional international organizations will quietly
grow in strength and authority to such an extent that together they will
operate as a world order system. The system has been building over
the years, in the civil aviation field and elsewhere, but without the
mortar of a substantial supra-national bureaucracy or an effective
judicial system. The United Nations and the Specialized Agencies have
less than 30,000 employees, while* the United States Federal
Government alone has over two million civilian employees. Their
combined budget is less than one percent of that of the United States
government. ICAO does have on paper a compulsory dispute-
settlement mechanism, but it is as yet virtually untried, and many other
international organizations, including the United Nations, lack even
that. In these circumstances, whenever international relations are
conducive to cooperation, and specialized international organizations
like ICAO can produce model regulations which are technically sound
and promise some degree of uniformity, this system will thrive. But
without an international bureaucracy to administer these laws and
without an operative supra-national court system to determine
violations of the law, in a time of major and continuing international
crisis the system could easily collapse, the uniformities and reciprocities
evaporating under the pressure of perceived short-run national interest.
Viewed from this perspective, Professor Buergenthal's book adds
to the evidence that the achievement of world order requires a radical
transformation of our international institutions, rather than reliance
upon the "natural" growth of existing institutions. Although growing
in some ways, our present institutions are probably incapable of
developing on a piecemeal basis into the kind of system ultimately
hoped for. Even transformation of the international organization
councils into legislatures, whether by amendment of their charters or
[Vol. 23
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re-evaluation of their present powers, 5 may be of little consequence
unless corresponding administrative and judicial institutions are equally
strengthened, so that international law will be administered in
preference to conflicting national law in the first instance, and in cases
of alleged violation both national and international courts will apply
international law in preference to conflicting national law. If so, there
is much to be done before the dawn of a secure and orderly world.
SAMUEL A. BLEICHER*
5. See Bleicher, The Legal Significance of Re-Citation of General Assembly Resolutions,
63 Am. J. INT'L L. 444 (1969).
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law (on leave to the
University of Missouri School of Law, 1969-70).
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THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY IN LAW. By Manfred S. Guttmacher, M.D.
Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1968. Pp. ix, 170. $7.50.
Of all the branches of medicine, psychiatry is the least capable of
achieving the degree of accuracy so essential to the tenets of law. Yet,
paradoxically, both law and psychiatry deal with that very elusive
aspect of human beings, the interpretation of behavior and emotion.
With such common bonds of interest between the two professions, it
is surprising, as the author points out, that there is such a token
inclusion of legal matters in the curriculum of psychiatry, and vice
versa. It is not surprising, however, that the author has mixed feelings
about the use of the jury trial in cases with heavy psychiatric
implication. Using a jury to determine the responsibility of an
individual is approved since it represents social judgment carried out
by representatives of the community. On the other hand, competence
to stand trial, commitment, or release from a psychiatric hospital are
not considered matters for jury consideration.
The most difficult problem in legal psychiatry is the determination
of criminal responsibility. Despite the great dissatisfaction expressed by
leading psychiatrists today, the M'Naughton rule-the knowledge of
right and wrong-remains the sole test of criminal responsibility in
most of the states. Every psychiatrist has had experience with patients
who knew right from wrong in every instance but who, because of
psychotic motivation, felt perfectly justified in committing various
crimes. Aniy attempt to make a more reasonable test of responsibility
has met with disappointment to varying degrees because of the very
complex nature of human behavior and its interpretation. The Durham
rule of 1954-holding that a person is not criminally responsible if the
offense was a product of a mental disease or defect-certainly is far
superior to M'Naughton but leaves many loopholes and many
unanswered questions.
Further complicating the picture is the factor of social
responsibility (or irresponsibility) which can be pointed out in almost
every case in which there is a psychiatric overlay. The patient brought
up in a culturally deprived environment presents an overwhelming
problem in determining individual responsibility because he may have
been encouraged to commit crimes and he may lack the conscience
which the average citizen possesses.
Perhaps even more puzzling are the questions of diminished
responsibility, such as the cases of criminal acts carried out where
intoxication prevents the degree of deliberation and premeditation
required as necessary elements for convictions in the first degree. The
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question of the patient with an abnormal electroencephalogram
exhibiting bizarre behavior also presents a major problem. In cases
such as these, the psychiatrist's data and its interpretation should be
only one item of evidence to be given its due weight by the jury.
The irresistible impulse is at best considered a controversial
concept. In actual practice, it is rarely used as a defense. Closely akin
is the concept of temporary insanity. This overworked defense in
criminal trials has brought about a general rejection of the theory, but
in fact it remains a valid clinical condition not infrequently
encountered. Bona fide examples of temporary insanity result, for
example, in alcoholic withdrawal, post convulsion confusional states,
and in temporary deliria. Perhaps the most-common example is the so-
called battle fatigue of World War I I-the idea that every man "has
his breaking point" apparently is valid. In supporting this concept, Dr.
Guttmacher points out that Jack Ruby, the alleged killer of Lee
Harvey Oswald and who the author examined one month after the
slaying, represents a cogent example of temporary insanity. "[H]is
weak ego which was for a day and half being constantly assaulted 65y
great emotional stresses-was suddenly overwhelmed, permitting
powerful, unconscious, hostile, aggressive impulses to gain ascendancy
and to rob him of a realization of the wrongfulness of his actions and
an inability to control his destructive impulses" (p. 72).
The author also discusses the controversial problem of whether
psychiatric experts should be partisan or court appointed. Early in the
formative years of the psychiatric body of knowledge, psychiatrists felt
that they could best carry out their mission to assist the court in
achieving justice by not testifying as partisans. The conflicts so often
encountered in psychiatric testimony, particularly in the past few years,
result chiefly from partisanship. Perhaps the most effective approach
in resolving this problem is the court clinic itself. The controversial plea
of insanity should have nothing to do with the adjudication of guilt
where others think that the recognition of insanity as a defense seems
to give the criminal law "a heart." One of the injustices results when
the insanity plea is accepted and the person is committed to a mental
hospital, where he often remains for long periods of time without
further disposition. Similar situations often exist surrounding the
question of competence to stand trial. Such a judgment frequently
results in the defendant being relegated to the back ward of a mental
hospital. To prevent injustices, periodic visits to the institution on the
part of the-trial court judge or his designee and routine reevaluation
are essential. Therapeutically speaking, Dr. Guttmacher feels the courts
19701
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should be quite liberal in permitting psychiatrically disturbed
defendants to stand trial. "Having had their day in court 1 believe that
most patients make a better hospital adjustment and prove to be more
responsive to treatment than if the spectre of a trial awaits them" (p.
104).
Presentation of new frontiers in psychiatric legal relationships are
discussed. Becoming increasingly helpful is the family court where the
great bulk of the work is sociological rather than legal and where
individuals trained in psychiatry and sociology are valuable assistants.
The undesirable aspects of penal incarceration tend to increase the
psychiatric and emotional problems of the offender although little is
done to correct the situation. The non-psychotic sociopaths, who make
up a large percentage of the inmates in our penal systems, can be
helped through new emerging treatment modalities. In general, these
treatment programs revolve around reality therapy, token therapy, and
behavior modification approaches. These new theories are making
inroads on the classic psychoanalytic approaches of the past. Follow
up out-patient care through a special category of therapists, the so-
called correctional therapists, can greatly decrease the rate of
recidivism.
The great pitfalls and dangers of enlisting false confessions
through the use of lie detection and narco investigation are outlined.
These tools of psychiatry have not reached the degree of clinical
validation that chemical tests of the blood and x-ray tests have
assumed.
The author concludes by outlining what he would like to see as
the role of psychiatry in the future: the adoption of the Durham rule;
the court-appointed expert; removal of the psychiatrist from the
decision making functions belonging to the jury; avoiding expression of
the defendants' criminal responsibility; the establishment of
therapeutically designed institutions for the treatment of selected
groups of offenders; the establishment of departments of criminology
at universities and others. By no means are all the answers presented
in the book, but the author discusses a most delicate subject fairly,
presenting both sides in a subject matter no less complex than the very
mind of the individual who is attempting to analyze it.
NAT T. WINSTON, JR., M.D.*




THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN CHILDREN. By Robert
D. Hess & Judith V. Torney. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1967.
Pp. xviii, 288. $9.75.
This book represents the first large-scale study of political attitude
formation in children. It is based on a survey of 12,000 elementary
school children in eight large and medium-sized cities. The research
offers practical payoffs to the legal profession by imparting an
understanding of the process by which potential actors in the American
political system develop their political orientations and of the content
of the .child's political world. Considerable evidence indicates that the
basis of many important political attitudes carried into adult life are
firmly established by the termination of elementary school.'
Consequently, a comprehension of children's induction into the
authority system of American society may eventually contribute to the
development of a more efficient law making and law enforcement
system.
The authors present data relating to many aspects of children's
orientations toward the political system. Throughout the book,
attention is given to the description of the political orientations, their
developmental sequence, and the agencies which influence attitudinal
development. I shall focus here on only a few of the more significant
aspects of the book.
The authors suggest that the important socialization agencies (e.g.,
family, school, and religious groupings) fail to present the realities of
political life to children. This omission may nurture. apathy or
contribute to the emergence in adult life of antisystem and illegal
techniques for influencing the political system (p. 61). For example,
political learning in the school does not sufficiently deal with the
operation of local, state, and national government. By implication, a
child who in later life desires to affect the government may be
disadvantaged due to his lack of understanding of the political process.
The authors state that school curricula under-emphasize the procedures
open to individuals for legally influencing the political system; for
example, the children exhibit an extremely limited knowledge of the
techniques and effectiveness of pressure groups in the election and
policy-making process (pp. 213, 218). It may be that a significant
number of pre-adults and young adults in American society become
involved in street demonstrations and even riots because they do not
fully understand the normal channels of political involvement.
i. For a summary of the literature on this point, see Jennings & Niemi, Patterns of Political
Learnings, 38 HARV. ED. REv. 443-45 (1968).
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The chapter on. attachment to government and regard for law
should be particularly relevant to the legal profession insofar as the
data presented relate to the development of support or non-support
orientations toward the legal system. The authors are specifically
interested in our compliance system, which they define as "a network
of laws, persons, and institutions vested with authority to enforce their
demands" (p. 50). Two dimensions of the compliance system are of
concern: (1) "the child's view of the power of authority figures to
punish non-compliance"; and (2) "the trust he has in the good
intentions of rules and their justice" (p. 50). The children tested viewed
laws as positive forces in society, seeing them as helpful and protective.
Statutes exist to help run the country and not necessarily to punish
wrongdoers. In seeing authority figures as benevolent, the children
developed a positive regard toward the power of the legal process to
punish law-breakers.
Hess and Torney imply that these initial orientations have vital
implications for compliance later in life. Although trust in law
decreases for the older children, the original high level of trust provides
the criteria an individual may apply as an adult in assessing the
performance of all authority figures. The authors assert that if an
individual discovers at an older age that laws are not always just, he
may nevertheless feel they should be. Accordingly, if he has an adult
experience with authority figures who enforce the laws arbitrarily, he
may be disillusioned and somewhat cynical about the incident, yet hold
to the principle of fair administration of law (p. 52).
So far these children are supportive of the legal system. Hess and
Torney present evidence, however, indicating the development of a
serious problem in our legal system. Contrary to the popular notion
that "crime doesn't pay," the percentage of respondents believing that
punishment inevitably follows crime declined with age from 57 percent
in the second grade to only 16 percent in the eighth grade. The authors
furnish a possible explanation for this trend as follows: "Older children
have learned, perhaps from their own experience, that punishment is
not the inevitable consequence of misdemeanor and they generalize this
conclusion to the legal system" (p. 57).
Among other orientations probed by Hess and Torney is the
children's perceptual relationship toward the policeman. Recent studies
indicate that police-community relations are often quite poor.'
2. These studies indicate that only a minority of whites hold a low opinion of the work of
the police, but that a significant majority of minority-group members-Mexican-Americans,
Puerto Ricans, and blacks-are either hostile toward or express a lack of confidence in the police.
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Although no causal relationship between this phenomenon and
children's political orientations is asserted by the authors, the survey
results suggest that this circumstance is not limited to the adult world
and is quite prevalent among children. The children interviewed
indicated that the police would always respond to people in trouble.
Yet, the older the child, the more the likelihood that he had no strong
positive personal feelings for the policeman. Whereas the second-grade
students indicated favorable attachments to the police, the eighth-grade
students exhibited no such attachments.
Perhaps the most significant conclusion of the Hess and Torney
effort is one of the least convincing, and leads us to a brief critical
examination of several of the book's more serious shortcomings. They
assert that "[t]he public school appears to be the most important and
effective instrument of political socialization in the United States" (p.
101). The major evidence offered to substantiate this conclusion is a
comparison between the children's responses to a number of political
questions and their teacher's replies to the same questions. As the age
of the child increases, teacher-child response conformity increases. The
problem with this data lies in the absence of parent's responses to the
questionnaire. Hess and Torney maintain that the teachers "as an
occupational group, are not representative of the general population
and may be expected to hold dissimilar views in several important
respects" (p. 111). Since no evidence is offered to corroborate this
assertion, it remains only a point of conjecture whether the school has
more impact on the development of political orientations than any
other agent. If the parent and teachers have similar political views, the
conclusion would be that little attitude discontinuity exists between the
older children and adults. If this were true the case for the school's
impact would not be warranted.
A further shortcoming of the book, which probably was
unavoidable, indicates the need for more research on the formation of
political attitudes. Hess and Torney inquire inconclusively into a
number of political attitudes. For example, the reader yearns to know
more about the absence of favorable child attachments to the
policeman. In another instance, six percent of a pilot test group of
students &hat° that they would not obey a policeman when they
thought he was og. Alhogh it seems highly important to
See TASK FORCE ON THE POLICE, THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN.
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 144-207 (1967); TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT
ASPECTS OF PROTEST AND CONFRONTATION, THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON THE CAUSES AND
PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST 241-92 (1969).
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determine why these children felt they would not comply, the question
was dropped because there were so few responses of non-compliance
and the inclusion of this alternative was disturbing to some children
and teachers (p. 54 n.14). The latter reason is an unfortunate
circumstance of survey research, but the former criterion for dropping
the question ignores the problem of identifying those individuals in
society who do not comply with the law and discovering why they so
act.
Given the enormous task of mapping the child's political world
and relating findings to the political system, it can be said that this
book marks an important contribution to a new area of inquiry. This
type of research should be of interest not only to the psychologist,
sociologist, and political scientist, but also to members of the legal
profession, politicians, and other government officials who are
ultimately responsible for the formulation and execution of laws. Civil
disobedience, often in the form of violent disorder, is increasing in the
United States. This circumstance may be one manifestation of the
inadequate process whereby young Americans are inducted into the
authority system. It indicates that our educational institutions must be
more reality-oriented. Individuals who do not comprehend the
complexity of society may respond to problems by side-stepping legal
constraints that are a part of that complexity. In other words, they
attempt to simplify an intricate system they do not understand by
engaging in direct forms of political involvement, such as
demonstrations. Educational institutions could contribute to the
alleviation of violence in American society by developing a more
community-oriented learning process. The courts could conduct an
educational program dealing with the operation of the legal system.
3
Furthermore, the police could directly help young people comprehend
the complex problems confronting the policeman in his attempt to
maintain law and order. The message brought to us by Hess and
Torney is that the early years during which the child develops his basic
political attitudes cannot be ignored; indeed, they may be the crucial
years.
DAN B. GERMAN*
3. See Raskin, Political Socialization in the Schools: Discussion, 38 HARV. ED. RE V. 550-
53 (1968).
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